In 2026, Chinese import growth will continue to expand, deepen and diversify, despite the US-led tariff wars.

When I began to spend more time in China in the early 2000s, the ultimate trade event was the Canton Fair (China Import and Export Fair). Fast forward to last November, the 8th China International Import Expo wrapped up in Shanghai after six bustling days, hosting participants from 155 countries, regions, and international organizations. The expo generated an intended transaction value of $83.49 billion — up 4.4 percent from the previous edition — a new record.

The coupling of the Canton Fair with the Shanghai Fair tells the story of the increasing importance of imports.

For a decade, global economic prospects have taken heavy hits, due mainly to US-led trade wars. So, how will Chinese imports fare in 2026 and beyond?

The rise of imports

When China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, this marked a major global shift. As tariff barriers were lowered and quotas reduced, growth was also spurred in imports of commodities, machinery, vehicles, and intermediate goods from developed markets like the EU, U.S., and Japan. 

In the process, China became integrated into global supply chains, especially for manufacturing inputs and high-tech components.

In the 2010s, the Chinese consumption market deepened as rapidly-rising incomes and fast-paced urbanization fueled consumer goods imports, including luxury items, auto parts, electronics, and food products. To support the modernization in the colossal economy, China also invested heavily in infrastructure imports, such as energy equipment, advanced industrial technology.

More recently, Chinese market has diversified. It has been the world’s second-largest import market for 17 consecutive years with record import volumes. While strategic considerations have increased in response to the West’s protectionism, new tariff adjustments are lowering duties on hundreds of goods to expand consumer and high-tech imports boosting higher-level openness. 

By March, revised foreign trade laws will further broaden market access, strengthen trade protections and support digital/green trade. 

Overall, imports have shifted from export-oriented production to higher-value consumption needs, industrial upgrades, and technological innovation.

Key trade partners benefiting

In textbook economics, advanced countries export high-tech goods and developing economies export agricultural commodities. In the case of US-China trade, it is largely a myth. In the past 25 years the US has been a major exporter to China, but mainly in agriculture (soybeans) and high-end products. Historically, a substantial portion of US exports has not fed Chinese high-tech, but the country’s massive pork population that has a penchant for America’s high-protein soybeans.

In recent years, trade tensions and tariffs have shifted some import patterns away from the US, prompting China to diversify suppliers. The net effect has been a reduced reliance on US suppliers in some sectors, with diversification toward ASEAN, EU, and Global South partners. 

EU exporters have benefited from China’s rising demand for luxury goods, machinery, automobiles, medical & consumer products. Australia is a key food and resource exporter. Other resource suppliers (Brazil, Russia) remain vital for energy and minerals. 

Trade with ASEAN and Belt & Road partners grew faster than overall trade, reflecting diversification objectives and infrastructure-linked supply chains. The net effect has been greater integration with regional economies and emerging markets – which represent the future.

In the peak decades of globalization, Chinese policies sought to optimize import expansion. Amid trade wars, the focus is on market-fueled risk mitigation. Import diversification reduces dependence on any single partner and enhances resilience.

Import expansion scenarios

In 2026, China’s rising middle class and urbanization continue to shift import structure toward consumption goods. High-tech imports (machinery, medical devices, advanced materials) support industrial modernization, while lower tariffs, free trade agreements and institutional opening seek to support balanced trade. 

In the “macro-balancing via imports” scenario, China temporarily tolerates higher consumer imports to stabilize prices and demand, due to deflationary pressure and overcapacity. This is the West’s neoliberal scenario, but least likely to materialize.

In the “external shock absorption” scenario, geopolitical pressures compel China to restructure imports by partners, not products.  It is a fragmentation scenario favored by the West’s trade warriors. It is neither probable nor in the interest of China or the West.

In the “managed rebalancing” scenario, import growth supports China’s industrial upgrading and the rise of the “new quality productive forces,” even amid trade wars. This is the most likely scenario. It will benefit China’s key trade partners. 

EU exports to China (particularly specialty machinery and industrial components, chemicals and pharma) could grow by 3-5 percent, although EU pressure for trade reset could introduce new non-tariff friction. US exports to China (agriculture, energy) could grow 2-4 percent. With Australia and Brazil, the import structure will be stable for rising commodity exports. ASEAN could see gains in intermediate goods and agri-exports, with Vietnam and Malaysia benefiting from supply-chain integration. Most African countries could see strong upside from expanded zero-tariff access., especially minerals and agriculture.

China gains price stability, diversification, and policy space.

Effort to normalize bypassing the WTO

Recently, the US Supreme Court struck down a major tranche of President Trump’s emergency-power tariff regime, which reduces policy volatility. But the Court left in place Section 301 and Section 232 tariffs. The former violates the WTO rules and the latter abuses them. Together, they seek to normalize bypassing the WTO. 

Moreover, Trump’s new tariffs compound long-term uncertainty.

There are scenarios that would be far more beneficial to the West and China. But they are not viable as long as unwarranted trade wars prevail and global economic prospects are constrained by policy-induced geoeconomic fragmentation in the West.